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PREVIEW; United States v. Havens: “I Have an AR-15 & I 




 The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals is scheduled to hear oral 
arguments in this matter on Wednesday, October 23, 2019, at 9:00 
a.m., in the 2nd Floor Courtroom of the Pioneer Courthouse, 
Portland, OR. Anthony R. Gallagher will likely appear on behalf of 





 The question presented here is whether defendant Joan 
Havens threatened, intimidated, or interfered with Forest Service 
employees when she warned them they would be shot if they 
trespassed on her property.1 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 Over the past few years, Joan Havens, whose property is 
surrounded by the Helena National Forest, has filed numerous 
complaints with the Forest Service for trespassing, cutting down 
trees, and burning slash piles on her boundary line.2 On January 11, 
2018, Havens confronted a group of Forest Service employees 
conducting controlled burns approximately half a mile from her 
property.3 Specifically, she screamed, “[I]f any of you . . . set foot 
on my property, I’m going to shoot[,] and I will shoot you!”4 She 
also told them she had an AR-15 and knew how to use it.5 Havens 
then drove a short distance up the road to Jennifer Taylor, a Forest 
Service Officer, and said, “I catch anybody on my land burning any 
 
*Candidate for J.D. 2021, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University 
of Montana. 
1 Opening Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 2, 4–5, United States v. Havens, (9th 
Cir. Jan. 24, 2019) (No. 18-30214). 
2 Opening Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 1, at 3–4. 
3 Id. at 4.  
4 Answering Brief of the United States at 4, United States v. Havens, (9th Cir. Feb. 
25, 2019) (No. 18-30214). 
5 Id. at 4–5. 
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piles, I have a goddamn AR-15 and I know how to use it.”6 Although 
Havens did not reveal her gun, the employees reported feeling 
intimidated because they did not know where her boundary line 
was.7 After the confrontation, the workers ceased all burning 
operations and left.8 
 
 Havens was convicted of Interfering with a Forest Service 
Officer, under 36 C.F.R. § 261.3, and was sentenced to seven days 
of incarceration.9 The U.S. District Court for the District of 
Montana, Great Falls Division, upheld the conviction.10 Havens is 
appealing to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, where the sole issue 
is whether her conviction was supported by sufficient evidence.11 
 
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
 
 Havens’ main argument on appeal is that the requirements 
of 36 C.F.R. § 261.3 (the “Regulation”) have not been satisfied.12 
The Regulation has three elements: (1) threatening, resisting, 
intimidating, or interfering with (2) any forest service officer (3) 
engaged in or on account of the performance of [their] official duties 
in the protection, improvement, or administration of the National 
Forest System.13 Havens argues that the Government cannot meet 
its burden with regard to the first element because her actions did 
not constitute threat, resistance, intimidation, or interference, and, 
even if they did, their intent was to prevent illegal activity on the 
part of the Forest Service—activity wholly distinct from the 
officers’ official duties.14 The Government argues there is sufficient 
evidence to find Havens guilty of at least three of the Regulation’s 
four prohibited activities: threatening, intimidating, and interfering 
with a Forest Service Officer.15 
 
 
6 Opening Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 1, at 5.  
7 Id. at 5; Answering Brief of the United States, supra note 3, at 5. 
8 Answering Brief of the United States, supra note 3, at 5. 
9 Id. at 1. 
10 Opening Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 1, at 1–2. 
11 Id. at 2. 
12 Id. at 9. 
13 36 C.F.R. § 261.3(a) (2017) (the first element is disjunctive, meaning any one 
of the four prohibited acts will satisfy it). 
14 Opening Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 1, at 9, 12–13. 
15 Answering Brief of the United States, supra note 3, at 7. 
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A. Defendant-Appellant Havens’ Argument 
 
  Havens maintains she did not threaten, resist, intimidate, or 
interfere with the workers and was lawfully protecting her 
property.16 The Government does not dispute her resistance 
argument.17  
 
 Havens argues her statement did not constitute a threat, and, 
even if it did, it was permitted by Montana law.18 First, Havens 
claims her statement was conditional and intended to prevent illegal 
actions (trespassing and destruction of property), and therefore not 
a threat.19 Second, Havens maintains her actions are protected under 
Montana law, which permits the threat to use force when such threat 
is reasonably necessary to prevent trespass into an occupied 
structure or real property.20 Under Montana law, Havens argues, she 
was rightfully protecting her property from trespassers.21 
 
 Next, Havens contends she did not intimidate the officers, 
and, even if she did, her intent was to prevent criminal trespassing 
on her property.22 Havens claims the officers had no reason to feel 
intimidated unless they trespassed onto her land.23 Havens compares 
her situation to admonishing a burglar that you will use force against 
them if they burglarize your house, which is not illegal.24 Therefore, 
Havens asserts, even if she did intimidate the officers, she was 
within her rights.25 
 
 Finally, Havens argues she did not interfere with the Forest 
Service workers, because the Forest Service did not have a 
legitimate interest in trespassing on her property.26 Havens’ 
argument is premised on her contention that she acted to prevent 
 
16 Opening Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 1, at 9, 12–13. 
17 Answering Brief of the United States, supra note 3, at 7. 
18 Opening Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 1, at 10–11.  
19 Id. at 10. 
20 Id. at 11; Mont. Code Ann. §§ 45–3–103(1), 45–3–104 (2017). 
21 Opening Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 1, at 12. 
22 Id. at 12–13. 
23 Id. at 12. 
24 Id. at 13. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
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illegality on the employees’ part.27 Since those illegal activities are 
not connected to the Forest Service’s legitimate interests, Havens 
maintains her actions did not constitute interference.28 
  
B. Plaintiff-Appellee United States’ Response 
 
 The Government argues Havens’ actions are sufficient to 
satisfy the Regulation’s requirements, because the evidence 
sufficiently shows Havens threatened, intimidated, and interfered 
with the Forest Service workers.29 
 
 A statement constitutes a threat if (1) the nature of the speech 
is objectively threatening, and (2) the speaker’s subjective intent is 
to threaten.30 The Government argues that both elements are 
satisfied: (1) the record supports a finding that a reasonable person 
would interpret Havens’ statements as an expression of intent to 
harm; and (2) since Havens did not show the Forest Service 
employees where her boundary line was, it is clear that she intended 
her statement to be threatening.31 
 
 Next, the Government cites to United States v. Hoff32 for its 
assertion that Havens intimidated the Forest Service officers.33 
There, the 9th Circuit upheld an intimidation conviction, because the 
officer reported feeling “timid and fearful” as a result of the 
defendant’s actions.34 Pursuant to Hoff, the Government argues that 
if the officers felt timid and fearful, then Havens must have 
intimidated them.35 The Government contends that since the officers 




29 Answering Brief of the United States, supra note 3, at 7. 
30 Id. at 8 (citing United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 
2011)). 
31 Id. at 10–11. 
32 22 F.3d 222 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that a defendant intimidated a Forest 
Ranger in violation of 261.3 when he told his barking dog “go get ‘em” three 
times within 80 yards of the Forest Ranger). 
33 Answering Brief of the United States, supra note 3, at 12. 
34 22 F.3d at 223. 
35 Answering Brief of the United States, supra note 3, at 12–13. 
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must have felt timid and fearful, and therefore, Havens must have 
intimidated them.36 
 
 Finally, the Government argues that Havens interfered with 
the officers, because her actions “opposed, intervened, hindered, and 
prevented” them from carrying out their official duties.37 The 
officers stopped working immediately after their encounter with 
Havens and have not resumed fuel management operations on the 
land near her property.38 Therefore, the Government maintains, 







 The court’s decision regarding the “threatening” prong of the 
statute will depend on whether Havens was justified in her threat to 
use lethal force. While the First Amendment protects our freedom 
of speech, it does not immunize “true threats.”40 True threats are 
statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious 
expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a 
particular individual or group of individuals.41 The 9th Circuit uses 
a conjunctive, two-part test to determine whether speech rises to this 
level.42 First, the speech must be objectively threatening, meaning, 
 
36 Id. at 13.  
37 Id. at 14 (citing United States v. Willfong, 274 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 2001), where 
the 9th Circuit upheld a 261.3 conviction against a defendant who refused to 




40 United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 2011). 
41 Id. (citing Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003)). 
42 United States v. Keyser, 704 F.3d 631, 638 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Vaksman, 472 F. App’x 447, 449 (9th Cir. 2012); Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1116–
17; United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Stewart, 420 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Saucy, No. 97-30126, 
1998 WL 115774, at 1 (9th Cir. March 16, 1998). See also Lovell ex rel. Lovell 
v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 372 (1996) (while the court primarily 
relied on the objective test, it also considered the speech in its “entire factual 
context,” and whether it was “unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and 
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a reasonable person could foresee that their statement would be 
interpreted as a serious expression of intent to harm.43 Second, the 
speaker must intend for the statement to be threatening.44 However, 
even if these elements are satisfied, Havens’ statement does not 
constitute a “true threat” unless the violence threatened is itself 
unlawful.45 
 
 Here, the court will likely find the objective standard is met. 
The court has held that conditional statements can be threatening,46 
and that imminence is only necessary if the speaker is inciting others 
to act.47 The listener’s reaction is also factored into the analysis.48 
Havens’ situation is similar to Lovell and Price, where the 
defendants made conditional threats. Havens’ statement that she had 
an AR-15 and would shoot the workers if they trespassed on her 
property was “specific and unequivocal.”49 Additionally, the 
workers’ reaction of abandoning their work site shows they 
perceived it as a true threat. Therefore, while Havens’ statement was 
conditional and arguably lacked imminence, the court will likely 
find it was objectively threatening. 
 
 The subjective standard is probably met here as well. The 
test does not require the speaker to intend to carry out their threat; 
rather, the only question is whether the speaker intended their 
statement to be threatening.50 This element was satisfied in Keyser, 
 
specific . . . as to convey a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of execution” 
(emphasis added), which implies a subjective component). 
43 Keyser, 704 F.3d at 638. 
44 Id. 
45 Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1116 (citing Black, 538 U.S. 343). 
46 See, e.g., Lovell, 90 F.3d 367 (where a student told her guidance counselor she 
would shoot her if she did not adjust her class schedule); United States v. Price, 
951 F.2d 1028 (9th Cir. 1991) (where the defendant told an IRS staff assistant 
that, if he was scheduled to meet with a particular revenue officer, he would bring 
a gun to the meeting). 
47 See Vaksman, 472 F. App’x at 449 (“We also reject Vaksman’s argument that 
the March 20 e-mail was not objectively a true threat because it contained no 
threat of imminent action. The government need only prove imminency [sic] 
where a speaker incites others to commit violence.”). 
48 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coal. 
of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1072 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. 
Watts, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969)). 
49 Lovell, 90 F.3d at 372. 
50 704 F.3d at 638. 
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where the defendant mailed packages containing sugar labelled as 
“anthrax.”51 Conversely, the court did not find a subjective intent to 
threaten in Bagdasarian, where the defendant posted hostile 
messages on the internet about President Obama, because the 
remarks were predictive and imperative in nature.52 Havens’ 
statement was neither predictive nor imperative. Moreover, Havens 
does not dispute that her intent was to threaten the workers.53 
Havens testified that she expected her statements to cause fear and 
prevent the workers from trespassing on her land.54 Therefore, the 
court will likely find Havens’ statement satisfies the subjective test 
as well. 
 
 Even if Havens was justified in threatening the workers, the 
court will probably find she was not entitled to threaten deadly force. 
Under Montana law, Havens could not have used deadly force 
unless she reasonably believed it was necessary to prevent the 
commission of a forcible felony or assault.55 While it is unclear 
whether this requirement also applies to the threat of deadly force,56 
all that is needed for a “true threat” is that the violence threatened is 
unlawful, not that the threat itself is unlawful.57 Considering 
Havens’ ongoing dispute with the Forest Service, she may have 
reasonably believed that the workers would trespass on her land. 
However, there is no evidence that she believed they would commit 
any forcible felonies.58 Therefore, the court will likely hold that 
Havens’ threat to use deadly force was a “true threat,” since deadly 
force would have been an act of unlawful violence. 
 
51 Id. at 635, 638–39. 
52 652 F.3d at 1122–23 (the defendant wrote, “he will have a 50 cal [sic] in the 
head soon,” and “shoot [him]”). 
53 See, e.g., Opening Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 1, at 10 (“She had 
no intention of showing them . . . her AR-15 unless they illegally trespassed on 
her land . . . Havens’s ‘threats’ were intended to prevent illegal actions on the part 
of the Forest Service.”). 
54 Answering Brief of the United States, supra note 3, at 10. 
55 MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45–3–103(2), 45–3–104 (2017). 
56 While 45–3–103(1) and 45–3–104 both mention “threat” in the main clauses of 
their respective statutes, which apply generally to all levels of force, they do not 
mention “threat” in connection to deadly force. Therefore, it is unclear whether 
the threat to use deadly force is subject to the same statutory requirement as the 
use of deadly force.  
57 Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1116 (citing Black, 538 U.S. 343). 
58 Opening Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 1, at 5 (Havens’ intent was 
to prevent the workers from burning slash piles on her property). 




 If the court applies the subjective standard for intimidation 
used in Hoff, it is likely to find that Havens intimidated the workers. 
The Regulation’s intimidation prong can be satisfied even if the 
threatening prong is not.59 In Hoff, a Forest Service Ranger cited the 
defendant for camping illegally.60 Hoff did not leave the campsite, 
and when the Ranger returned, Hoff said “go get ‘em” three times 
to his growling dog.61 The Ranger fled the scene and reported 
feeling intimidated.62 The 8th Circuit applied similar reasoning in 
United States v. McDill,63 where the officer reported feeling 
intimidated by the defendant’s aggressive tone and demeanor.64 In 
response to Havens, the workers reported feeling intimidated, to the 
extreme of abandoning their work site and ceasing all operations 
near Havens’ property. Therefore, if the court relies on Hoff, as the 
Government suggests it should, then it will likely hold that Havens’ 




 The court’s analysis regarding “interference” will depend on 
whether disobeying an officer is an essential component of 
interference. The two 9th Circuit cases that upheld interference 
convictions under the Regulation were cases where the defendants 
disregarded the officers’ orders.65 Here, by contrast, Havens did not 
disobey any orders from a Forest Service officer; rather, she 
approached the workers to warn them not to trespass on her 
property.  
 
 Havens’ argument that the workers were not engaged in their 
official duties is likely meritless. A Forest Service officer is 
 
59 See, e.g., United States v. Hoff, 22 F.3d 222 (9th Cir. 1994). 
60 Id. at 222–23. 
61 Id. at 223. 
62 Id. 
63 871 F.3d 628 (8th Cir. 2017). 
64 Id. at 632. 
65 See United States v. Bucher, 375 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2004) (where the defendant 
actively tried to prevent Forest Service Rangers from arresting a hiker, despite the 
Rangers warning him to stay off the trail); United States v. Willfong, 274 F.3d 
1297 (9th Cir. 2001) (where the defendant disregarded an officer’s orders to 
discontinue logging). 
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performing an “official duty” when the officer is on duty and 
performing an act that contributes to the protection, improvement, 
or administration of the National Forest.66 Havens argues that, 
because trespassing on her property is not logically related to the 
protection, improvement, or administration of the National Forest, 
the workers were not engaged in their official duties. However, at 
the time of the confrontation, the workers were not trespassing. They 
were on duty, conducting controlled burns half a mile from Havens’ 
property. Therefore, the court is likely to reject this argument, and 
instead base its decision on whether defiance of an officer is an 




 The court will uphold Havens’ conviction if any prong of 36 
C.F.R. § 261.3(a) is satisfied. Interference is the least likely to be 
upheld. Therefore, if the court does not uphold the conviction under 
the intimidation prong, it will need to resolve whether Montana law 
justified Havens’ threat to use lethal force 
 
66 Willfong, 274 F.3d at 1300. 
